On the basis of our analysis and observations of projects in the database provided by Independent Project Analysis (IPA), one-half of topsides have more than 10% weight growth from authorization to completion, and more than one in three substructures have more than 10% weight growth from authorization to completion. Meanwhile, estimated contingency has a much narrower range compared with actual required contingency.
Summary
Offshore-facility weight is significantly related to the cost, schedule, and complexity of offshore-facility projects. Therefore, controlling the weight growth of offshore facilities is important to project success. This paper seeks to understand weight growth and its causes among different project phases. By use of the detailed database of oil and gas projects provided by Independent Project Analysis, we conducted a rigorous statistical analysis of offshorefacility weight growth to identify the root cause(s). This paper evaluates the weight growth for 153 global offshore projects at the end of the concept selection and authorization gates. The study results show that industry weight growth is much higher than expected.
Front-end loading (FEL) is a core work process of project teams before authorization. FEL is a process to develop sufficient strategic information to address risk and make decisions to commit resources to maximize the chance of a successful project. The FEL work process is divided typically into phases or stages, with a pause for assessment and decision making about whether to process (Fig. 1) . Although the industry typically allocates 13% of dry weight for weight contingency at the end of FEL 2 and 6% of dry weight at authorization to account for unexpected weight growth, one-half of the topsides had more than 10% weight growth from authorization to completion, and more than one in three substructures had more than 10% weight growth from authorization to completion. The data also show that estimated weight-contingency range is much narrower than that of actual required contingency. This analysis shows that the weight growth of most offshore facilities is caused by poor engineering status for the facilities at authorization. The analysis also shows that setting aggressive schedule targets erodes the benefits of good engineering definition. In general, projects with good engineering and aggressive schedule targets have an additional 9% weight growth compared with projects with good engineering and nonaggressive schedule targets. The weight growth of offshore facilities was found across many different offshore-facility concepts (e.g., fixed platforms, spars, tension-leg platforms). This research provides an understanding of industry offshore-facilities weight performance and the main causes of weight growth, and offers recommendations for improving weight predictability.
Introduction
With new technological developments, high energy demand, and existing-oilfield depletion, there has been steady growth in the discovery of offshore resources. As a result, more offshore facilities will be installed to increase oil and gas production. Given the importance of offshore weight to offshore-facility success, understanding weight growth is critical to the petroleum industry. fixed, compliant, or buoyant substructure, the most-important component of the offshore facility. Table 2 lists the typical topsides and substructure weight components. Fig. 2 shows topsides dry-weight growth from the end of frontend loading (FEL) 2 to completion and from the FEL 3 gate (authorization) to completion. As shown, the average topsides weight growth is 21% from the end of FEL 2 to completion, with one-standard-deviation variance ranging from -20 to 62%, indicating significant weight growth and high uncertainty. From authorization to completion, the topsides experience an average weight growth of 10%, with one standard deviation from -9 to 30%. The average weight growth and variance from authorization to completion is less than that from the end of FEL 2 to completion, which is in line with our expectation that weight estimation becomes more accurate with more engineering work being performed through FEL 3. Fig. 3 shows a similar trend for substructure weight. Substructures experience 24% weight growth from the end of FEL 2 to completion, with a large variance ranging from -12 to 65%. Substructures experience 7% weight growth from authorization to completion, with a relatively small variance ranging from -10 to 22%. Fig. 4 shows weight growth for the five offshore-facility concepts. As shown, all five concepts see weight growth, and it appears companies are associated with these projects, including international oil companies, independent oil companies, and national oil companies. Meanwhile, the offshore facilities are evenly distributed around the globe and include most of the oil-and gas-production locations. The data set also includes five major offshore-facility concepts: steel-piled jacket (SPJ), tension-leg platform (TLP), semisubmersible (FSS), spar platform, and floating production, storage, and offloading system (FPSO). In summary, the offshore-facility industry's broad range of characteristics is well-represented in the data set.
Offshore-Facility Weight Performance
Exploration-and-production offshore facilities include two major components: topsides and substructure. Topsides is a common term for facilities placed above the sea level that are supported by a that FPSO systems tend to have the highest weight growth. However, statistical analysis shows that the weight-growth difference among the five concepts is not significant. These results indicate that offshore-facility concepts are not major drivers of weight growth. This provides a foundation for investigating offshorefacility weight growth overall, instead of for an individual concept.
The extent of the weight growth may be a surprise for those in the industry. In terms of average weight growth and variance, project teams systematically fail to understand uncertainty.
Industry Contingency-Setting Performance
As discussed in the preceding section, weight growth is a concern for offshore facilities. To mitigate the effects of weight growth resulting from uncertainty, Independent Project Analysis collected client data showing that the industry assigns a certain amount of weight as a contingency for offshore facilities. Fig. 5 shows the industry-average estimated weight contingency. On average, for the topsides, 16% of dry weight is used as a contingency at the end of front-end loading (FEL) 2, and 7% is used at authorization; similar amounts are assigned for substructures. Variances also significantly decrease from the FEL 2 gate to the authorization gate-with more engineering performed during front-end engineering design, there is less uncertainty at authorization, therefore less contingency is needed. Fig. 6 shows a comparison between the estimated and required contingency for topsides. For the topsides, in terms of the average contingency, the estimated contingency is just short of 5% at the end of FEL 2 and 3% lower at authorization. Although the contingency levels being set by project teams are only slightly below what the industry experiences on average, in terms of variances, the estimated contingency is much narrower than the actual, required contingency. It shows clearly that contingency estimates line up with the average very closely, but fail to account for uncertainty.
The trend for substructure weight contingency is very similar (Fig. 7) . This tells us that the project teams expected weight growth, and they assigned an average amount of contingency on the basis of general rules, but did not consider each project-specific situation, such as completeness of engineering definition and if the project was schedule driven. Consequently, although industry average contingency setting is fine, the estimates generally fail to incorporate the appropriate level of uncertainty. This means that project teams fail to estimate the uncertainty of offshore-facilities weight because they do not understand what drives weight growth in the estimates. Thus, understanding the drivers of weight growth is important for improving weight estimation.
Next, we explore the reasons for these outcomes so that we can determine best practices for improving performance and help project teams allocate the appropriate amount of weight contingency to avoid systematically underpredicting contingency.
Understanding Poor Weight Predictability
Many factors affect the industry's weight-predictability performance. With our analysis, we concluded that offshore-facility growth is driven by two major factors: engineering status and schedule-driven projects.
Engineering status looks at aspects related to the process design (or conceptual design) progress. Independent Project Analysis (IPA) classifies design status in four levels: full-design specification, advanced study, limited study, and screening study. IPA defines advanced study as best practical at authorization and limited study as best practical at the end of front-end loading (FEL) 2. At the authorization gate, approximately 58% of projects have reached the advanced-study level, with 11% at full-design specification. There are no projects at the screening-study level, but a large number of projects are at limited study. We group the four levels into two categories for this study. At the authorization gate, good engineering status is assigned if the project has achieved advanced study or fulldesign specification. Otherwise, we assign a poor status. As shown in Fig. 8 , weight growth is not significantly different between full-design specification and advanced study. There was a slight improvement in weight performance from advanced study to full-design specification, but the difference and variance are not significant. However, there is a significant difference between the good-engineering-status group and the poor-engineering-status group, in terms of both average and variance. The average weightgrowth difference between good and poor engineering status is 11% for topsides and 16% for substructure. In addition, the good-engineering-status group has consistently better weight predictability than the poor-engineering-status group. Therefore, engineering status is a key factor in determining weight outcomes. Suboptimal engineering status leads to large weight growth and high uncertainty. Case A clearly illustrates the weight-growth problem resulting from suboptimal engineering status and helps us to understand the underlying issue (Table 3) .
If a project is schedule-driven, it means that businesses are willing to trade capital cost for schedule, and the schedule targets are typically achieved through overtime, extra shifts, and a longer overlapping of phases. A major difference between upstream and other industries is that the upstream business tends to prioritize the schedule for exploration-and-production (E&P) projects. Therefore, E&P project teams are regularly told to minimize the duration to first oil production or accelerate the schedule-more than 50% of upstream projects are explicitly schedule-driven. Quality starts to erode when projects intend to achieve unobtainable or very aggressive schedules. IPA research shows that schedule-driven upstream projects tend to have multiple failed outcomes-cost, schedule, and production attainment (Nandurdikar and Kirkham 2012) . Fig. 9 shows that schedule-driven projects also have worse weight performance than nonschedule-driven projects. The weight growth for schedule-driven topsides projects is 7% higher than that of nonschedule-driven projects; schedule-driven projects also have a slightly larger variance. Substructures have even worse weight outcomes. Schedule-driven substructures have more than 11% weight growth and a significantly larger variance than nonschedule-driven substructures. Schedule-driven projects tend to have overlapping phases that prevent teams from optimizing the weight design, leading to weight growth. For example, a project with an aggressive schedule required engineering to be completed without enough hard data that were supported from available reservoir analyses, causing an error in determining the net payload. In addition, to reach the schedule targets, the project team was willing to take any available alternative during execution instead of what had been planned [e.g., choose available material grade and weight growth as they progress from authorization through execution to completion. The study results show that the average contingency levels are actually reasonable; the primary issue is that the project teams do not recognize the uncertainty of the weight estimates at poor levels of project definition. However, there are ways to improve estimating with best practices in engineering to eliminate uncertainty. Weight predictability will improve with use of best practices; in particular, projects with advanced engineering status are strongly positioned for good weight predictability. Good engineering status is the foundation for successful weight outcomes, but schedule pressure can destroy the advantages from good engineering. However, schedule pressure has no effect on the weight outcomes for projects with poor engineering. E&P projects tend to be schedule-driven, but this trade-off between weight growth and schedule for good-engineering-status projects should be recognized by the industry. In some extreme cases in which it is impossible to achieve good engineering definition, it is best to acknowledge the limitations faced by the project and set enough contingency to account for the large uncertainty.
Nomenclature
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Poor engineering status and schedule-driven projects both have profound adverse effects on weight outcomes, but these two factors are not mutually exclusive-they are interactive. Fig. 10 shows the effect on weight predictability for four different combinations of these two factors. Topsides have only 2% weight growth when they are nonschedule-driven and have good engineering status, which shows that the industry can attain strong weight performance if project teams have good engineering definition and a reasonable schedule. However, when we compared the first two good-engineering-status groups, it is observed that projects with good engineering status had 9% higher weight growth if they were driven by schedule. Thus, projects with good engineering that were not schedule-driven will underrun 6% on the basis of the 9% average industry estimate contingency in weight estimation, while projects with good engineering that were schedule-driven will use all of the weight contingency. In other words, speed can destroy the benefits of good engineering. Schedule-driven projects can cause many issues in engineering and execution-tasks out of order, errors, excessive overlap of schedule phases, late changes-that can contribute to weight growth. Fig. 10 also shows that when engineering status is poor, we do not see much difference between the weight growth for nonschedule-driven and schedule-driven projects. The conclusion is that engineering work quality is the foundation of successful weight predictability, but more than 30% of projects fail to achieve the best practical engineering definition. There are many cases in which poor engineering will cause late changes in execution, leading to overlap between engineering and construction that, in turn, results in onshore work with fabrication issues and weight changes for many offshore facilities. The weight outcomes for projects with poor engineering status are likely to be poor, whether the project is schedule-driven or not. Case C in Table 3 illustrates the consequences of poor engineering on a schedule-driven project.
Conclusions and Recommendations
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